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Patent Law-Diamond v. Chakrabarty-The U.S. Supreme
Court Rules that Living Matter Is Patentable
Microbiologists can now alter the basic chemical structures of life forms'
and genetically engineer microorganisms to perform a wide range of functions
that will benefit mankind.2 These microscopic creatures are valuable because
of their high cost of research and development, and their limitless possibilities
for utilization. Accordingly, scientists are seeking to patent newly developed
microorganisms. 3 There has been serious dispute, however, as to whether 35
U.S.C. § 101,4 which delineates the range of patentable subject matter, applies
to living organisms.5 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the United States Supreme
Court decided that live, man-made microorganisms are patentable subject
matter.
6
In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed a patent application
asserting thirty-six claims pertaining to his invention of a new kind of bacte-
rium capable of degrading diverse components of crude oil.7 The bacterium
was designed to be used in the treatment of oil spills.8 One of Chakrabarty's
claims was for a patent on the new bacteria themselves. 9 The patent examiner
rejected this claim first on the grounds that microorganisms are "products of
nature" and second because as living things they are not patentable subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.10 Chakrabarty appealed the rejection to the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA)" which reversed, stating that
1. See NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1976, at 355.
2. Genetic engineering refers to the modification of the cellular structure of microorganisms
by recombining the molecules that make up genes. This is referred to as recombinant DNA tech-
nique. For a brief description of this process see ProposedRevised Guidelines, Recombinant DNA
Research, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,096, 33,101.
3. See NATL GEOGRAPHIC, supra note 1.
4. U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof,
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
5. The patentability of live microorganisms also raises questions of ethics, economics, sci-
ence, and religion. For a general symposium of.these and other related matters, including legal
questions involved see AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 185-319 (1979).
6. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
7. Id. at 305. Chakrabarty's microorganism is described as "a bacterium from the genus
Pseudomonas containing therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, each of said plas-
mids providing a separate hydrocarbon degradative pathway." Id.
8. Oil is composed of several component hydrocarbon compounds. Various bacteria have
the capacity to degrade various components of oil, but each strain of bacteria can only degrade a
single component. When several strains were mixed in earlier attempts at biological control of oil
spills, the different strains exhibited inhibiting effects on each other leaving the oil spills largely
intact. Chakrabarty developed a new microorganism that is able to degrade several different com-
ponents of oil, thereby eliminating the inhibition effect that was present in the use of several
bacteria strains, and increasing the viability of biological control of oil spills. See Respondent's
Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303
(1980).
9. 447 U.S. at 306.
10. Id. By ruling that Chakrabarty's microorganism was a product of nature the patent ex-
aminer rendered his second objection superfluous. See text accompanying notes 22-27 infra.
11. Chakrabarty in fact first appealed his rejection to the Board of Appeals of the Patent and
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"the fact that microorganisms are alive is a distinction without legal signifi-
cance. ... 12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the statutory
question whether Chakrabarty's invention was a "manufacture" or a "compo-
sition of matter" and thus patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101.13 The Court held
that Chakrabarty's microorganism was within the range of patentable subject
matter under the statute.' 4
In 1790, Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional power, enacted the
first patent laws.' 5 The purpose of the patent laws is to encourage scientific
and technological progress by granting inventors exclusive rights to their in-
ventions for a limited period of time.' 6 The first patent enactment defined
patentable subject matter by listing broad categories of possible inventions.17
These statutory categories have remained substantially intact and are intended
to be expansive.' 8 Because Congress rarely enacts specific exceptions to these
categories,19 the criteria for determining patentable subject matter are largely
determined by the courts.20
Until Chakrabary the courts had never explicitly addressed the patenta-
Trademark Office which reversed the Examiner's holding that the claims are for products of na-
ture, but affirmed the rejection on the basis that the patent was "drawn to a live organism." In re
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The CCPA reversed, holding that its decision in In
re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), controlled. 571 F.2d at 42. In re Bergy involved a
patent claim for a "biologically pure culture" of a naturally occurring microorganism; the purified
organism does not occur in nature. The Berg, court held that claims to microorganisms are not
excluded from 35 U.S.C. § 101 because they are alive. Chakrabarty's case was procedurally inter-
twined with Bergy. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to Bergy and then va-
cated and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584 (1978). 438 U.S. 902 (1979). The Chakrabarty writ of certiorari was dismissed by
stipulation after the CCPA vacated its Chakrabarly ruling for reconsideration with Berg. In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The CCPA affirmed its earlier decision. Id. A petition for
certiorari was applied for and granted in both Bergy and Chakrabarly. Bergy cancelled his patent
claim and his case was dismissed as moot. Brief for Respondent at 10, Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303 (1980).
12. 596 F.2d 952, 975.
13. 447 U.S. at 307. The categories of statutory subject matter are: 1) processes; 2) ma-
chines; 3) manufactures; 4) compositions of matter, 5) designs; 6) plants. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101,
161, 171 (1954); see generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS, ch. 6 (2d ed. 1980).
"Manufactures" are those articles which have been materially transformed by the manufacturing
process. Id. at 6-16. "Compositions of matter" refers to the substances or materials themselves
(chemical compounds or physical mixtures). Id. at 6-17.
14. 447 U.S. at 318.
15. Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109. The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
16. Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241 (1832).
17. See generally P. ROSENBERG, supra note 13.
18. The legislative history of the 1952 recodification of the patent laws indicates that Con-
gress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."
S. REP. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2394,
2399; H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws 2394, 2399.
19. For example, Congress has specifically excepted atomic weapons from patentability. See
42 U.S.C. § 2181 (1976).
20. For a discussion of the 'Judicial evolution" of the patent laws see Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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bility of living matter per se.21 Patent claims on living objects traditionally
were rejected because living objects fell into a judicially created class of non-
patentable subject matter designated "products of nature." 22 The "products of
nature" classification is designed to clarify the distinction between objects in-
vented or contrived by man and naturally occurring phenomena discovered by
man. The assumption behind this distinction is that natural phenomena,
known and unknown, are public property. Because a patent grants an inven-
tor control over his invention, a patent should only be granted when the inven-
tor's creativity changes the character of a natural object into a new and useful
item that can properly be described as "man-made." Where the patent appli-
cant merely provides new descriptions of, or prescriptions for, natural phe-
nomena, without changing the character of that phenomena, his invention is
labeled a "product of nature" and is unpatentable subject matter.23 Thus the
products of nature distinction excludes natural phenomena from patentable
subject matter for two reasons: 1) a patent may not be granted where it will
deprive the public of any previously enjoyed rights--even in unknown proper-
ties of the world, and 2) a patent upon naturally occurring phenomena would
block further advances in the use of that phenomena.24
Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 25 provides a good example
of the Court's application of the products of nature concept to bacteria. In
Funk, the patentee discovered a more efficient means to employ certain strains
of bacteria in the inoculation of leguminous plants. The Court declared the
patent claim invalid because the bacteria was only "some of the handiwork of
nature." 26 The Court stated that "[tihe qualities of these bacteria, like the heat
of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all
men and reserved exclusively to none." 27
21. The Patent Office routinely grants patents for "processes" using living organisms. To
illustrate, a process using sodium may be patentable, but sodium itself is not. In fact,
Chakrabarty's "process" claim was originally granted by the patent examiner. 447 U.S. at 306.
22. See Dunner & Lipsey, The Patentability of Life Forms, New Technologies and Other
Hooks of Nature, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 190, 203 (1979).
23. In addition to the products of nature principle, the courts have rejected patents on living
objects because claimants could not meet the rigid statutory requirement of complete description
of the object to be patented. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (Supp. 1980). The difficulty of descriptions of micro-
organisms used in processes has been solved by a recent Patent Office procedure that allows a
deposit of culture for public inspection in the Patent Office. The culture is accepted in lieu of a
written description. See In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
24. P. ROSENBERo, supra note 13, at § 1.04.
25. 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
26. Id. at 131.
27. Id. at 130. Another relevant example of the products of nature subject matter appears in
American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931), in which the court held that a
borax impregnated orange was unpatentable as a product of nature, stating that,
Addition of borax to the rind of natural fruit does not produce from the raw material an
article for use which possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property ....
There is no change in the name, appearance, or general character of the fruit. It remains
as fresh orange fit only for the same beneficial uses as theretofore.
Id. at 11-12. See also O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853) (patent denied on electro-
magnetic forces used in telegraphic communication); DeForest Radio Co. v. General Elec. Co.,
283 U.S. 664, modbled, 284 U.S. 571 (1931) (patent denied on purified tungsten produced by a
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The 1930 Plant Patent Act, enacted by Congress to respond to contempo-
rary advances in plant hybridization techniques, extended patent protection to
certain asexually reproducing plants that previously had been regarded as
products of nature.28 The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress
hoped to provide the same incentive to agricultural inventors that industrial
inventors enjoyed. 29 In 1970, Congress enacted the Plant Variety Protection
Act which extended patent-like protection to sexually reproducing plants.30
Although the Plant Variety Protection Act is not actually patent law, the pro-
tection provided under the statute closely parallels patent protection.31
The legislative history seems to indicate that Congress intended to classify
certain hybrid plants as patentable subject matter on the grounds that the
human element in their development justified describing those plants as made
by humans "in aid of nature."32 If this was the case, the plant patent legisla-
tion was enacted as an exception to the products of nature doctrine. Because
the legislative history does not specifically refer to the products of nature doc-
trine, however, it can be argued that Congress, quite apart from judicial inter-
pretations, enacted the plant patent legislation as an exception to a general
Congressional understanding that living matter was unpatentable simply be-
cause it was living. From this perspective, if Congress believed living matter
was patentable, the plant patent legislation was superfluous. 33 This uncer-
novel procedure). But see Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir.
1958) (purified vitamin B12 held patentable despite the fact that an impure form of the substance
appears in nature).
The products of nature distinction can be problematic and confusing. In the first place, the
bright line between products of nature and man-made products is illusory. All inventions are
products of nature in the sense that natural materials must be molded in accordance with the laws
of nature to produce any item. Moreover, the justification for separating the actions of human
beings from the processes of the natural world is not clear, humans are inextricably a part of
nature. Finally, the products of nature test, as applied by the courts, often bears no relation to the
reasons for distinguishing between patentable and unpatentable subject matter. Patents cannot be
granted where they will give inventors control over objects that have been freely used and enjoyed
by the public, however, when inventors produce objects that have not existed in the world and
have not been used and enjoyed by the public-g., purified bacteria innoculants in Funk and the
borax impregnated oranges in American Fruit Growers-the products of nature distinction is mis-
used. See generaiiy, Dunner & Lipsey, supra note 22, at 208-09.
28. Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 161-64 (1954)). In 1889 the Commissioner of Patents held that claims to a component of the
pine tree were not patentable. Exparte Latimer, 1889 Dec. Com. Pat. 123. The Latimer case is
cited as general precedent for the proposition that plants are products of nature and as such were
unpatentable until the 1930 Plants Patent Act. 447 U.S. at 311-12.
29. See, ag., S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1930); A Bill to Provide for Plant Patents: Hearings on H..R 11372 Before the House
Comm. on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1930).
30. Act of Dec. 24, 1970, tits. I-I, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583
(1973)).
31. The Plant Variety Protection Act is administered by the Office of Plant Variety Protec-
tion, a division on the Department of Agriculture. Grants of protection under this statute are not
called patents, but rather are designated Certificates of Plant Variety Protection. The protected
breeder has rights to exclude others from a variety of actions regarding his innovation. See P.
ROSENBERG, supra note 13, § 6.01(6), at 6-23 & 6-24.
32. See S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1930); H.R. REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1930).
33. In objecting to Chakrabarty's claim, the Government took this position. Brief for Peti-
tioner at 23-37, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). The Government cited two cases
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tainty as to legislative intent is important in Chakrabarty because a Congres-
sional understanding that living matter is unpatentable subject matter would
weigh heavily against Chakrabarty's claim.
The importance of Congressional intent as an aid to patent law interpre-
tation is best understood in light of the basic national policy against monopo-
lies. Because a patent is a grant of limited monopoly, the Supreme Court, in
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp. ,34 adopted a policy that the patent
laws should be strictly construed by the judiciary. In Deepsouth, the Court
maintained that "a clear and certain signal from Congress" is a prerequisite to
judicial expansion of the patent laws.35 In Parker v. Flook,36 a case the Court
recognized as directly bearing on Chakrabart,37 the Court recognized that
Congress is the governmental body that is best equipped to explore and handle
the complex ramifications of patent law expansion. The Fook opinion held
that the judiciary "must proceed cautiously when. . . asked to extend patent
rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." 38 In Rook, the Court de-
nied the claim to a patent on a novel algorithm used in computers on the
ground that mathematical formulae are nonpatentable subject matter.39
F/ook clearly represented the Court's adherence to the principle that expan-
sion of the patent laws must come from the legislature, not the judiciary.40
In deciding Chakrabary, however, the Supreme Court began with a dif-
ferent approach to the determination of the patentability of live man-made
microorganisms. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, stressed the
language of 35 U.S.C. § 101 as an indication of the statute's scope.41 The
Court reasoned that if its task was to determine whether Chakrabarty's micro-
organism could properly be described as a "manufacture" or a "composition
of matter" within the meaning of the statute,42 then it should look to the "ordi-
nary, contemporary common meaning[s]" of these words. 43 In fact, the Court
relied on dictionary definitions culled from previous cases interpreting the
meaning of the words "manufacture" and "composition of matter."44 The
to support its contention that the case law indicated that the courts assumed the unpatentability of
living organisms: Guaranty Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (3d Cir. 1931), aft'd
per curi, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933) (in dicta, the court
speculated that an application for patent on bacteria per se might be analyzed differently than a
claim for a process using bacteria); In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (the court as-
sumed the claimant would be unable to obtain a patent on isolated bacteria per se because such
bacteria would be a "product of nature").
34. 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
35. Id. at 531.
36. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
37. See note I 1 supra.
38. 437 U.S. at 596.
39. Id.
40. For a thorough discussion of Parker v. Flook, see Comment, Computer Program Patenta-
bilit-he CCP. oues to Follow the Lead of the Supreme Court in Parker v. Rook, 58N.C.L. l~v. 319 (1980).prmCorinPke .Hk,5
41. 447 U.S. at 308.
42. Id.
43. Id. (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
44. The Court defined "manufacture" as "the production of articles for use from raw...
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether
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Court emphasized that these words are modified in the statute by the word
"any" and concluded: "In choosing such expansive terms as 'manufacture'
and 'composition of matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress
plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope."'45 To
support this conclusion, the Court provided a brief survey of the relevant legis-
lative history, to demonstrate the expansive nature of the statute defining pat-
entable subject matter.46
By stressing the comprehensiveness of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Court at-
tempted to avoid the argument that recognizing Chakrabarty's claim would
expand the statute. The Court's decision is underpinned by the conclusion
that the statute defining patentable subject matter fundamentally and neces-
sarily is expansive in that Congress could not and did not intend to anticipate
all possible invented subject matter.47 Because the statute is all but open-en-
ded, it follows that limitations on 35 U.S.C. § 101, in the form of specific ex-
clusions of subject matter, should be provided by Congress. As Congress has
not specifically excluded living matter per se from the scope of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, the Court would not "read into the patent laws limitations and condi-
tions which the legislature has not expressed."'48
Though the Chakrabarty Court based its decision on the all-inclusive na-
ture of 35 U.S.C. § 101, it could not ignore the fact that the judiciary had
placed limitations on patentable subject matter. Chief Justice Burger noted
that "laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" have been ex-
cluded from patentable subject matter by previous courts.49 The Court in-
sisted that these limitations do not apply to Chakrabarty's microorganism,
however, because it is a "nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition
of matter."50 To illustrate this point the Court pointed to its language in Funk
Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. 51 describing the patentee's bacteria as
only some "handiwork of nature."52 In Funk, the patentee merely had created
suitable conditions in which unaltered bacteria could perform their natural
by hand-labor or by machinery." 447 U.S. at 308. This definition appeared in American Fruit
Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931). The Court defined "composition of matter" to
include "all compositions of two or more substances and ... all composite articles, whether they
be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be gases, fluids,
powders or solids, 447 U.S. at 308 (citing Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.D.C.
1957) (citing 1 WALKER ON PATENTS § 14, at 55 (Ist ed. Deller 1937)).
45. 447 U.S. 308.
46. Id. at 308-09. The Court reviewed the original Patent Act of 1793 as written by Thomas
Jefferson which defined patentable subject matter as "any new and useful art, machine, manufac-
ture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement [thereof] . . ." Act of Feb.
21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1954)). The Court noted that subse-
quent patent statutes retained this expansive language. 447 U.S. at 309. The Court also cited the
committee reports accompanying the 1952 recodification of the patent laws as evidence that Con-
gress intended statutory subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by man."
Id. See note 18 su~pra.
47. 447 U.S. at 316.
48. Id. at 308 (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
49. 447 U.S. at 309. See notes 22-27 and accompanying text supra.
50. 447 U.S. at 309.
51. 333 U.S. 127, 131 (1948). See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
52. 447 U.S. at 310.
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function more efficiently; the bacteria themselves were not materially trans-
formed by the patentee. Chakrabarty's microorganism differed in that "the
patentee [had] produced a new bacterium with markedly different characteris-
tics from any found in nature ... .-53 In other words, Chakrabarty's micro-
organism was not a product of nature but a product of man.
Having relied on the broad scope and "plain meaning" of 35 U.S.C. § 101
as the basis for its decision, the Court turned to the Government's objections
to Chakrabarty's claim.54 The Court first considered the charge that the plant
patent legislation indicated a congressional assumption that living matter was
nonpatentable. The Court found the legislative history concerning the 1930
Plant Patent Act inconclusive on whether Congress actually focused on the
patentability of living matter per se.55 Furthermore, the Court argued that
prior to the 1930 Act plants were treated as unpatentable subject matter be-
cause they fell into the products of nature category.56 The 1930 Plant Patent
Act was a specific legislative reaction to advances in plant breeding.5 7 Plant
breeders were developing species of plants that nature alone could not pro-
duce. Citing relevant legislative reports, the Court insisted that the 1930 Plant
Patent Act was enacted as a specific exception to the exclusion of plants as
products of nature rather than an exception to a general belief that living mat-
ter was unpatentable. 58 The Court concluded: "Congress. . .recognized that
the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but be-
tween products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inven-
tions."59
The Court, however, failed to discuss an important inference from its in-
terpretation of the history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. The ability to create
hybrid plants was perhaps the first instance when humans could scientifically
alter the nature of living things.60 Regardless of the underlying rationale, this
technological mastery over the structure of living matter was assimilated into
the patent laws only by express congressional decree. If Congress, rather than
the courts, had to act to make hybrid plants patentable because they were no
longer exclusively products of nature, it follows that other life forms that are
no longer exclusively products of nature should be included in the range of
patentable subject matter only by statute. By this reasoning, Chakrabarty
overreaches the proper range of the Court's power.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 310-14. The Court maintained that "[n]o Committee or Member of Congress...
expressed the broader view. . . that the terms 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' exclude
living things." Id. at 312.
56. 447 U.S. at 313.
57. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
58. 447 U.S. at 313.
59. Id.
60. Of course, men have been breeding animals and plants for centuries. This involved put-
ting two creatures together and letting them reproduce. Techniques of hybridization, however,
involve selecting and matching characteristics of plants that would not have occurred in nature. It
is on this basis that Congress enacted the 1930 Plants Patent Act. See note 29 supra.
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The Court, however, could argue that because Chakrabarty's invention
was so novel, it was never within the product of nature classification. Unlike
hybrid plants, Chakrabarty's organism never could have existed without
human intervention in natural phenomena. 61 Because the product of nature
category is a judicial creation, it is certainly within the Court's power to deter-
mine its scope. Moreover, an examination of the products of nature doctrine
shows that a rejection of Chakrabarty's organism was not justified on those
grounds. First, Chakrabarty's invention never existed in nature, thus a patent
granted on the invention would not deprive the public of rights it previously
had enjoyed. Second, Chakrabarty's patent would not impede further ad-
vances in microbiology any more than patents on chemical innovations im-
pede the progress of further chemical research.62 As the Court noted, its
decision might affect the pace of genetic engineering but research in microbi-
ology will proceed because of the nature of the scientific mind, and will do so
with little regard for the state of the patent laws.63
Although the policies behind the 1930 Plant Patent Act and the 1970
Plant Variety Protection Act were ostehsibly the same, four dissenters in
Chakrabarly placed considerable emphasis on the 1970 Act as an indication of
congressional rejection of bacteria as patentable subject matter.64 Justice
Brennan, dissenting, stated: "The fact is that Congress, assuming that animate
objects as to which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented,
excluded bacteria from the set of patentable organisms." 65 There is no legisla-
tive history to support this contention.66 Moreover, if Congress assumed that
animate objects which had not been included specifically within the subject
matter of the patent laws could not be patented, then a specific exclusion of
bacteria would be unnecessary. In addition, the Plant Variety Protection Act
is not a patent law, and thus only peripherally related to 35 U.S.C. § 101.67 As
the majority found, the exclusion of bacteria from plant variety protection
merely shows that Congress did not consider bacteria to be plants.68 The Act
61. See Kiley, Learning to Live with the Living Invention, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 220 (1979).
62. Patents can only be granted where the inventor has filed a complete description in the
Patent Office. These descriptions are a matter of public record. Thus, while an inventor is granted
a limited monopoly on his invention, he has sacrificed a potential trade secret. Moreover, because
all scientific advancements grow out of earlier scientific work, the public description of a patented
invention provides future inventors with fertile ground for future innovations and improvements.
63. 447 U.S. at 315.
64. Id. at 320-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The C.C.P.A. had already held that bacteria were
not plants for the purposes of the 1930 Plant Patent Act. See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834(C.C.P.A. 1940).
65. Id.
66. The statute states: "The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other
than fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the variety, or his succes-
sor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety protection therefor. . . ." 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976).
There is no legislative history as to why bacteria are expressly excluded, but the most obvious
inference is that Congress was merely following the reasoning of the court inArzberger, i.e., bacte-
ria are not plants. See note 64 supra.
67. There is slight support for the contention that because the Plant Variety Protection Act is
similar to the Plant Patent Act, it should be interpreted as if it were patent law. See Northcross v.
Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curiam).
68. 447 U.S. at 314.
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does not indicate that Congress intended to address the patentability of man-
made live microorganisms per se.
The more difficult argument against including Chakrabarty's microorga-
nism within the range of 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that such a ruling would expand
the scope of the patent laws without express congressional authorization.
Since man-made organisms did not exist before the last decade it cannot be
denied that Chakrabary extends patent protection to an area wholly unfore-
seen by Congress in the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 101. It is equally true, how-
ever, that Congress cannot anticipate the entire realm of inventive subject
matter. The question, therefore, is not whether there is an expansion of the
patent laws, but whether that expansion is proper. In Parker v. Flook,69 the
Court urged caution in expanding the patent laws.70 In Chakrabarty, the
Court insisted that Flook did not stand for the proposition that inventions
which were unanticipated by Congress are per se unpatentable.71 According
to the Court, Rook merely denied a patent to a mathematical formula based
on "principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 'ideas' or phe-
nomena of nature. '72 To allow patents only on inventions anticipated by
Congress would be inconsistent with the basic requirement that patentable ob-
jects be entirely novel, ie., unanticipated. 73
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Chakrabarty relies mainly on the ob-
servation that there is nothing in the patent laws or their legislative history to
indicate that Congress intended to exclude living organisms per se from the
broad language defining patentable subject matter. Coupled with this obser-
vation is the contention that the words "manufacture" and "composition of
matter" are unambiguous and can be used in their "ordinary contemporary
meaning" to describe Chakrabarty's microorganism. It can be argued, how-
ever, that the words "manufacture" and "composition of matter" are not ordi-
narily used to refer to living things. The idea that one can "manufacture" a
life form is certainly novel, and though "composition of matter" can be used to
describe any object whatsoever, scientists and laymen generally concur that
living matter is unique matter because it is alive.74 Thus the use of the words
"manufacture" and "composition of matter" to describe a living organism
stretches the meanings of those words far beyond common usage and, a forti-
ori, beyond congressional usage. Because the words "manufacture" and
"composition of matter" must be forced into an uncustomary usage to describe
live microorganisms, the Court should have focused its analysis on why Con-
gress intended 35 U.S.C. § 101 to apply to living matter. Absent a showing of
direct congressional intent, the prescription for judicial caution enunciated in
69. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
70. Id. at 596.
71. 447 U.S. at 315.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 316.
74. See Luckem & Hesseltine, Living Organisms 4re Not Compositions or Manufactures
Under 35 U.S.C 101, 7 AM. PAT. L.A.QJ. 236, 250 (1979); see also Note, The Patentability of
Living Organisms Under 35 US.C § 101. In re Bergy, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1361 (1978).
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Parker v. Flook should control and preclude an expansion of 35 U.S.C. § 101
to an area that undeniably was "wholly unforeseen by Congress. '75
In a broad sense, the idea of granting patents on life forms per se raises
serious extra-legal questions. The Government argued that Congress is the
best forum for investigating the economic, social, and scientific ramifications
of extending the scope of 35 U.S.C. § 101 to man-made microorganisms. 76
Congress not only has a greater capacity for inquiry in depth than the judici-
ary but it also can act upon its particular findings by precisely tailoring its
legislation to meet particular objectives.77 While the Court agreed with this
general proposition, it argued it was merely exercising its power to interpret a
statute passed by Congress.78 The Court saw no ambiguities in 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 and maintained that its broad construction of the language of the statute
was commensurate with the purpose of the statute.79 The Court also con-
verted the Government's argument to its own use by rejecting suggestions that
a grant of a patent to a live, man-made organism is contrary to public policy.80
That, the court replied, is a matter for Congress to decide because the legisla-
ture is the proper arena for decisions of "high policy."81 Obviously, if Con-
gress found the grant of patents to live, man-made microorganisms to be
against public policy, Congress could enact specific legislation excluding living
matter from the scope of patentable subject matter.82
The Chakrabarly decision will have a positive effect on the application of
microbiological techniques to the advantage of industry. Industrial investors
will be more willing to commit resources to the development of useful, man-
made microorganisms when their investment may result in a limited monop-
oly on a microorganism that is much in demand. Chakrabarly will also in-
crease dissemination of scientific knowledge because the results of
microbiological breakthroughs will be filed in the Patent Office as public infor-
mation rather than being concealed as trade secrets. Although the
Chakrabarty Court was correct in assuming that research into the basic struc-
tures of life would proceed regardless of the state of patent law, it was incor-
rect in assuming that Chakrabarly will affect only the pace of future
research.83 Chakrabarty will also affect genetic research qualitatively. There
will be more research into man-made microorganisms which can produce a
profit for investors. If there are risks inherent in genetic engineering, the risks
will increase with the amount of industrial development and use of live man-
made microorganisms. There will also be greater possibilities for microbiolog-
ical innovations. that will generally benefit mankind, as Chakrabarty's inven-
75. 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978).
76. See Brief for Petitioner, at 10, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
77. Id. Congress might extend protection to certain live, man-made microorganisms without
extending protection to living organisms in general.
78. 447 U.S. at 315.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 317.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 318.
83. Id. at 316-17.
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tion undoubtedly will. In a single action, Chakrabarty opens the door to the
possible risks and benefits of industrial utilization of genetically engineered
microorganisms. Chakrabarty could not, and did not, fully address these com-
plex issues. A more detailed investigation of these matters should take place
in Congress.
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